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Central Bank Transparency and the
Signal Value of Prices
A CENTRAL BANK must be accountable for its actions, and its decisionmak-
ing procedures should meet the highest standards of probity and technical
competence. In light of the considerable discretion enjoyed by independent
central banks, the standards of accountability that they must meet are per-
haps even higher than for most other public institutions. Transparency allows
for democratic scrutiny of the central bank and hence is an important pre-
condition for central bank accountability. Few would question the proposi-
tion that central banks must be transparent in this broad sense.
A narrower debate over central bank transparency considers whether a
central bank should publish its forecasts and whether it should have a
publicly announced, numerical target for inﬂation. This narrower notion
of transparency also impinges on issues of accountability and legitimacy,
but the main focus in this debate has been on the effectiveness of monetary
policy.
Proponents of transparency in this narrower sense point to the impor-
tance of the management of expectations in conducting monetary policy.
A central bank generally controls directly only the overnight interest rate,
“an interest rate that is relevant to virtually no economically interesting
transactions,” as Alan Blinder has put it.
1 The links from this direct lever
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1. Blinder (1998, p. 70).rates, depend almost entirely upon market expectations, and monetary pol-
icy is effective only to the extent that the central bank can shape the beliefs
of market participants. Long-term interest rates are inﬂuenced in large part
by the market’s expectation of the future course of short-term rates. By
charting a path for future short-term rates and communicating this path
clearly to the market, the central bank can inﬂuence market expectations,
thereby affecting mortgage rates, corporate lending rates, and other prices
that have a direct impact on the economy. Having thus gained a lever of
control over long-term rates, monetary policy achieves its effects through
the IS curve, through quantities such as consumption and investment.
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that many leading mon-
etary economists today see the management of expectations as the task of
monetary policy. For Lars Svensson, “monetary policy is to a large extent
the management of expectations”; Michael Woodford puts it similarly:
“not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current
conditions, very little else matters.”
2
The reasons for this preeminent role of expectations in monetary policy
are explained particularly well for a general audience in a policy speech
by Ben Bernanke, titled “The Logic of Monetary Policy.”
3 Bernanke con-
siders whether monetary policy’s steering of the economy is in some way
analogous to driving a car. Monetary policy actions are akin to stepping
on the accelerator or the brake, to stimulate or cool the economy as appro-
priate given its current state. Bernanke notes that, although this analogy is
superﬁcially attractive, it breaks down when one notes the importance of
market expectations of the central bank’s future actions. If the economy is
like a car, then it is a car whose speed at a particular moment depends not
on the pressure on the accelerator at that moment, but rather on the expected
average pressure on the accelerator over the rest of the trip. Woodford
employs a similar transport metaphor: “central banking is not like steering
an oil tanker, or even guiding a spacecraft, which follows a trajectory that
depends on constantly changing factors, but that does not depend on the
vehicle’s own expectations about where it is heading.” Instead, optimal
policy is history dependent, in that the central bank commits itself to a
rule that takes into account past conditions, including even some that no
longer matter for an evaluation of what is possible to achieve from now
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2. Svensson (2004, p. 1); Woodford (2005, p. 3).
3. Bernanke (2004b).on. This is so because it was the anticipation of such a rule that deter-
mined the market’s expectations today.
4
The pivotal role of market expectations puts the central bank’s commu-
nication policy at center stage, and this view has been adopted to some
extent by all central banks, but embraced most enthusiastically by those
that have adopted explicit inﬂation-targeting monetary regimes.
5 However,
one issue seems to have received less attention than it deserves, namely, the
consequences of central bank transparency for the informativeness of
prices. In order for the central bank to know how it should manage expec-
tations, it must obtain its cues from signals emanating from the economy,
which themselves are the product of market expectations. On the face of it,
there is an apparent tension between managing market expectations and
learning from market expectations: the central bank cannot manipulate
prices and, at the same time, hope that prices yield informative signals. A
recent speech by Federal Reserve governor Don Kohn identifies limits to
transparency for these reasons.
6
This tension between managing expectations and learning from them
reﬂects the dual role of a central bank in the conduct of monetary policy. In
addition to being an active shaper of events, the central bank must act as a
vigilant observer of events, in order to obtain its cues for future actions.
The roles are complementary, since only by being a vigilant observer of
events can it be effective as an active shaper of outcomes. On the surface at
least, there is a worry that an emphasis on the latter role will detract from
the former. The central bank holds a mirror up to the economy for cues for
its future actions, but the more effective it has been in manipulating the
beliefs of the market, the more the central bank will see merely its own
reﬂection.
The dilemma between managing market prices and learning from mar-
ket prices would disappear if the central bank were omniscient, not having
to rely on the information flowing from market prices. Then its only task
would be to convey its knowledge to the rest of the economy, thereby
aligning market expectations to its own (correct) view. Even if the central
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6. Kohn (2005).bank is far from omniscient, one could argue that it is so much better
informed than any other individual agent in the economy that it should
convey what it knows forcefully, so as to educate the myriad other actors
in the economy. In this view the tension between managing market expec-
tations and learning from market expectations would be resolved in favor
of the former.
This way of resolving the tension is implicit in the following argu-
ment in another speech by Bernanke, titled “Central Bank Talk and Mon-
etary Policy”:
. . . when the monetary policy committee regularly provides information about
its objectives, economic outlook, and policy plans, two benefits result. First,
with more complete information available, markets will price financial assets
more efficiently. Second, the policymakers will usually find that they have
achieved a closer alignment between market participants’ expectations about the
course of future short-term rates and their own views.7
Here Bernanke makes two claims:
—When the central bank conveys its own views clearly, market prices
will be more informationally efﬁcient.
—When the central bank conveys its own views clearly, the market’s
expectations will be closer to the central bank’s own expectations.
We will argue that there are strong reasons for believing that the sec-
ond assertion holds true, but that the ﬁrst assertion is more open to ques-
tion. In particular, the stronger are the reasons for believing the second
assertion, the more doubtful is the ﬁrst. In short, the ﬁrst assertion may be
false because the second assertion is true.
Informational Efﬁciency
Informational efficiency can be expected to have large favorable wel-
fare consequences via two broad channels: the allocational role of finan-
cial market prices in guiding investment decisions, and the information
revealed by market outcomes as a guide to the central bank’s optimal con-
trol problem. We take each of these in turn.
Financial market prices have a large impact on the level and type of
investments undertaken. For central bankers, the allocational role of the
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
7. Bernanke (2004a).yield curve in determining the duration of investment projects is of partic-
ular importance. Irving Fisher in his Theory of Interest gives the example
of three possible uses for a plot of land: for forestry, farming, or strip min-
ing.
8 The interest rate used to discount future cash ﬂows largely determines
the ranking of the three projects. Long-duration projects such as forestry,
where the bulk of the payoffs arrive in the distant future, are most attrac-
tive in an environment of low interest rates. When interest rates are high,
short-duration projects like strip mining dominate. Since investment deci-
sions are often difﬁcult to reverse, distortions to investment incentives can
have a lingering effect long after the initial misallocations.
The current debate in the United States on the booming residential
housing market and the appearance of “exotic” mortgage products that
backload repayments hinges on the correct pricing of long-term cash
ﬂows. If long-term interest rates are low, wage income in the distant future
is given a large weight, and even exotic mortgage products seem viable
when backed by the large present values of lifetime wage income. For cen-
tral bankers who must also keep a vigilant eye on overall financial sta-
bility, the allocational role of financial market prices thus takes on great
signiﬁcance.
This allocational role is not limited to the yield curve as revealed in the
prices of ﬁxed-income securities. Equities that promise high payoffs in the
distant future, as do, for example, many technology stocks, are a prime
example of investments in long-duration projects. In the same way that
high prices of long-duration ﬁxed-income assets push down long-term
interest rates, high stock prices lower the implicit discount rate on dividends
paid by stocks. Christopher Polk and Paolo Sapienza, as well as Qi Chen,
Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang, document evidence that investment is sen-
sitive to the information conveyed by stock prices.
9 Anecdotal stories of
formerly staid power companies venturing into telecommunications and
other more fashionable business areas and then coming up short of expec-
tations have been a constant theme since the bursting of the technology
bubble a few years ago.
Central bankers have a large impact on ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, it
could be argued that the central bank’s impact can sometimes be too large.
By the nature of the problem, it is difﬁcult to gauge whether the reactions
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However, the paper by George Perry in this volume provides some rare,
tantalizing evidence that market prices may be distorted by anticipation of
central bank actions. The evidence comes from the contrasting market
reactions to two sets of ofﬁcial data on the labor market: the Current Popu-
lation Survey of households and the Current Employment Statistics survey of
nonfarm business payrolls. Perry shows that the two measures are roughly
comparable in terms of their ability to track broad labor market conditions,
and a simple average of the two does well in combining the informational
content of both series.
However, the ﬁnancial markets certainly do not accord equal weight to
the two series. The nonfarm payroll numbers are given far greater weight
and are much anticipated by market participants. Michael Fleming and Eli
Remolona document the sometimes dramatic reactions in the bond mar-
ket to the nonfarm payroll numbers.
10 The fact that the Federal Reserve is
known to accord more weight to the nonfarm payroll survey undoubtedly
plays on the minds of market participants. Given the importance of others’
reactions to news, the fact that other market participants take note of the
announcement is reason enough for any one market participant to take
note. Thus the contrasting reactions to the two labor market series may
be attributable largely to the background presence of the central bank.
Keynes’s famous “beauty contest” analogy comes to mind, and we will
return to this below.
Perry’s ﬁndings echo a similar phenomenon from an earlier era, namely,
the exaggerated reactions to announcements of money stock aggregates
during the period after 1979, when the Federal Reserve began to empha-
size growth of the money stock as an indicator of the monetary stance.
11
Although the Federal Reserve had published weekly estimates of monetary
aggregates for some time (and continues to do so today), the announce-
ments in the early 1980s became particularly significant with the added
importance that the Federal Reserve placed on these aggregates at the time.
These money stock announcements became one of the focal events in ﬁnan-
cial markets, if for no other reason than that signiﬁcant movements in
interest rates were associated with sizable unanticipated changes in the
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
10. Fleming and Remolona (1999).
11. Roley (1983), Cornell (1983), and Roley and Walsh (1985) have documented the
heightened reaction to money stock announcements in the early 1980s.money stock. The market’s reactions to such announcements were notice-
ably larger during the period following the shift in the monetary regime in
1979 than in that preceding it. Roley shows that, “over the 11⁄2-hour inter-
vals spanning the weekly announcements the variance of the change in the
three-month Treasury bill yield in the three years following October 1979 is
more than thirty times larger than that in the previous two-year period.”
12 In
particular, the variance of the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate
from 3:30 p.m. to 5 p.m. on the announcement day (the announcement
always came at 4:10 p.m. on Friday) was 0.0016 for the period from 1977 to
September 1979, but then jumped to 0.0536 between October 1979 and
October 1982.
When the market understands that the central bank itself is watching the
money stock for its policy stance, the strategic interactions among market
participants will take center stage. The actual magnitudes will matter less
than the fact that the announcements make the numbers common knowl-
edge. The forces at work are similar to the forces that move markets after
breaking news stories. The news itself may not be a surprise to some mar-
ket participants, but the fact that it has become commonly known is news.
It is this news that serves as the lightning rod that moves markets.
We now turn to the second channel through which informational effi-
ciency may have an impact on economic welfare. In order for the central
bank to steer the economy, it must have good information on the current
state of the economy; in particular, it must know how close the economy is
to full capacity. If the signals reaching the central bank are not informative,
the control problem will be made more difﬁcult.
The ﬂattening of the Phillips curve in many countries in the 1990s is
perhaps one indication that this signal value of aggregate prices has deteri-
orated. Flint Brayton, John Roberts, and John Williams note how the main
feature of the Phillips curve—that inﬂation rises when labor markets
tighten—was turned on its head during the economic expansion in the
1990s, when the unemployment rate fell below its long-run average of
around 6 percent and then fell below 5 percent, even as inﬂation fell.
13
(Figure 1 depicts the unemployment-inﬂation relation from 1967 to 2002
in both the United States and the United Kingdom.) Replacing unemploy-
ment with a measure of capacity utilization does little better to rescue the
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Figure 1. Phillips Curve in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1967–2002Phillips curve. Although a ﬂattening of the Phillips curve could be inter-
preted as a shift in the natural rate of unemployment itself, the authors con-
clude that the explanation that best ﬁts the evidence is that ﬁrms’ price-cost
margins, rather than prices themselves, have taken the brunt of the adjust-
ment. To the extent that costs are part of the fundamentals, and prices are
expected to signal cost conditions, the fact that price-cost margins bear the
brunt of the adjustment indicates that the signal value of aggregate prices
has changed in recent years for the worse. (Here the informational efﬁ-
ciency of prices pertains to goods prices rather than asset prices.)
A telltale sign of the deterioration of the information value of signals
would be large revisions to past data. The larger are the revisions to ofﬁcial
data, the larger was (in retrospect) the uncertainty about economic condi-
tions at the time.
The Bank of England’s experience with data revisions in 2005 is re-
vealing in terms of the difficulties of trying to steer the economy without
good information about where the economy is at the moment. Figure 2
shows two fan charts for GDP growth as published in two consecutive
issues of the Bank’s Inﬂation Report.
14 It is immediately evident that GDP
growth in early 2005 was revised sharply downward, so that the realized
outcome in the first quarter of 2005 fell in the outer tail of the projected
distribution of outcomes as given by the top panel. This led to some
scrutiny and comment from the press.
15
Another evident difference is in the shape of the fan chart for the
August 2005 report: here the short-range forecasts are given much larger
dispersion—the shape is more like a hammer than a fan. The change was
introduced to emphasize the uncertainties surrounding current economic
conditions. The larger range of outcomes permissible in the short run
anticipates possible data revisions.
The August 2005 report describes the divergence between official sta-
tistical estimates of GDP and those obtained through business surveys,
especially for the services sector. If the survey respondents put excessive
weight on the prevailing conventional wisdom about the level of economic
activity, it would make the surveys far less informative about current con-
ditions than otherwise. Christopher Sims’ notion that economic agents
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 9
14. Bank of England (2005).
15. See Geoffrey Dicks, “Bank of England Needs to Re-examine Its Forecasts,” Financial
Times, August 10, 2005.10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
August 2005
Percent change in GDP on a year earlier














2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
May 2005
Percent change in GDP on a year earlier
Figure 2. GDP Growth Projections, United Kingdom, 2005–08exercise “rational inattention,” economizing on their information gather-
ing, would exacerbate this deterioration of information value.
16
Greater uncertainty about current conditions would be a telltale sign of
the deterioration of signal values, and the new convention of drawing a fan
chart with a “fatter” base could be seen as an indication of greater aware-
ness of such uncertainty. Strictly speaking, the base of the fan ought to
start in the distant past—after all, there is great uncertainty even about the
past. The broadening of the base at the current period is a nod to the con-
vention of drawing the fan chart as if current conditions were known. The
more the information value of central bank signals deteriorates, the wider
will be the base of the fan. Thus one of the key questions we will address is
how the precision of the central bank’s information changes as it shifts
from one disclosure regime to another.
Much evidence has accumulated recently that the publication by central
banks of numerical targets for inflation has been associated with a more
effective anchoring of inﬂation expectations.
17 By squeezing out the corro-
sive and insidious effects of inﬂation expectations from the economy, the
anchoring of inﬂation expectations brings large welfare gains. But, we would
argue, the ﬂipside of “well-anchored” is “uninformative”: price signals that
are well anchored are also price signals that have little signal value. They
reveal very little to observers looking to them for signs of underlying shifts
or trends in the economy. When informational efﬁciency emerges as a con-
cern, well-anchored expectations cease to be unambiguously desirable.
Gregory Mankiw, Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers examine the disper-
sion of inﬂation expectations in survey data and ﬁnd that inﬂation expecta-
tions have become more concentrated around the mean.
18 Andrew Levin,
Fabio Natalucci, and Jeremy Piger investigate how well the mean inﬂation
expectations have been anchored, also from survey data.
19 They examine
data on inﬂation forecasts from Consensus Forecasts, Inc., who poll market
forecasters twice a year on their forecasts of inﬂation one to ten years ahead.
Levin, Natalucci, and Piger conclude that long-term inﬂation expectations
(looking six to ten years into the future) for a group of inﬂation-targeting
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is evidence that they still respond to actual outcomes in the United States
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ending at date t. The coefﬁcient β is the focus of the investigation, since it
measures the extent to which expectations of future inﬂation are inﬂuenced
by the experience of recent inﬂation. The authors’ results indicate that β is
small and insigniﬁcant in the formal inﬂation-targeting countries, but pos-
itive, large, and signiﬁcant for the non-inﬂation-targeting countries.
A similar picture emerges from studies that examine the expectations
embedded in ﬁnancial market prices. Refet Gurkaynak, Levin, and Eric
Swanson use daily data to examine the market’s compensation for expected
future inﬂation as revealed in the difference between forward rates on nom-
inal government bonds and inflation-indexed bonds.
20 The authors apply
this measure of forward inflation compensation to interest rates for U.S.,
Swedish, and U.K. government bonds to extract estimates of long-run
inflation expectations. (Sweden and the United Kingdom are inflation-
targeting countries, but the United States is not.) For all three countries
the authors find stable long-run inflation expectations, but there are re-
vealing differences. For the United States long-term inﬂation expectations
appear to be inﬂuenced by recent experiences of inﬂation, whereas no such
dependence is observed for the United Kingdom or Sweden. These re-
sults echo those obtained by Levin, Natalucci, and Piger. They imply that
such “excessive” dependence, relative to the baseline model, in the forward
inﬂation premium in the United States occurs because the Federal Reserve
does not have a numerical objective for inﬂation to help tie down long-term
inﬂation expectations. In addition, Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson show that
long-term forward yield differences in the United States respond excessively
to economic news, including surprises in the federal funds rate, a result that
the authors attribute to shifts in market participants’ views of the Federal
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20. Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2005).Reserve’s long-term inﬂation objectives.
21 To contrast their results for the
UnitedStateswiththosefortheinﬂation-targetingcountries,theauthorsshow
that such excess sensitivity in long-term inﬂation expectations disappears
in the United Kingdom after May 1997, when the Bank of England gained
operational independence and monetary policy moved to a formal inﬂation-
targeting regime.
The nature of the problem makes it difficult to bring empirical evi-
dence to bear on whether the central bank’s information has, indeed, deteri-
orated. Thus, at best, our argument is conjectural and speculative. However,
we show below that the precision of the central bank’s information will
depend, in general, on the disclosure regime. The more the central bank
discloses, the less precise the signals it receives will be. The fan charts of
central bank forecasts become fatter, sometimes considerably so, when it
chooses to disclose more. We also return, in closing, to the Bank of Eng-
land’s experience in 2005 for some clues as to what kind of evidence one
might look for to help answer the question of informational precision for
the central bank.
The theme explored in this paper is the tension between managing ex-
pectations and the impaired signal value of both financial market prices
and goods prices when expectations are managed. We argue that the qual-
ity of the central bank’s information is endogenous, and that a central bank
that attempts to steer the market’s beliefs more vigorously will suffer a
greater deterioration in the information value of its signals. We will begin
by outlining some technical considerations in developing our argument.
But ﬁrst we revisit a much older debate in economics between Hayek and
his socialist contemporaries on the informational role of prices and the role
of the market mechanism in aggregating the distributed information of
economic agents.
Hayek Revisited
Friedrich von Hayek’s 1945 essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society”
has remarkable resonance for today’s debate on the informational role of
prices.
22 As is well known, Hayek was arguing against his socialist con-
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21. Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2005); this result is elaborated in Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005).
22. Hayek (1945).temporaries and other advocates of Soviet central planning. However, his
comments are equally relevant for today’s debate on central bank trans-
parency. He poses the problem in the following terms:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined
precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dis-
persed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely
a problem of how to allocate “given” resources—if “given” is taken to mean
given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these “data.”
It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of
the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know. Or, to put it brieﬂy, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given
to anyone in its totality.23
Hayek was directing his argument against his contemporaries who argued,
from Paretian optimality principles, for the superiority of a centrally planned
economy. Chief among this group was Oskar Lange, who developed his
arguments in his paper “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” published
in two parts in the ﬂedgling Review of Economic Studies in 1936 and 1937.
24
Lange was an economist in the Paretian tradition who, together with contem-
poraries such as Abba Lerner and John Hicks, provided the formal apparatus
for the development of modern welfare economics. Lange presented one of
the ﬁrst formal arguments for what economists now know as the “two funda-
mental theorems” of welfare economics. But rather than seeing these results
as buttressing the case for the market system, Lange saw them as compelling
arguments in favor of central planning and socialism.
For Lange, following Pareto’s lead, prices are merely rates of exchange
of one good for another, and it is immaterial whether they are set by the cen-
tral planner or determined in the market by supply and demand. The central
planner, however, has the advantage that he or she can act “as if” the Wal-
rasian auctioneer were setting prices, thereby overcoming the distortions of
the market economy resulting from imperfect competition, transactions costs,
and externalities and achieving a superior allocation of resources.
It was into this debate that Hayek weighed in. Prices, he argued, are not
merely the rates of exchange between goods. They have a second role, that
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23. Hayek (1945, pp. 519–20).
24. Lange (1936, 1937).of conveying information on the fundamentals of the economy and the
shocks that constantly buffet it. In more modern parlance, price systems
are mappings from states of the world to observed market prices, and, as
such, they convey information on the shifting fundamentals of the econ-
omy that is not available to any one agent or subset of agents. Hayek’s
argument for the superiority of the market mechanism rests on the premise
that the information revealed in prices is likely to be far more illuminating
and timely than that which any central planner could possibly hope to
amass, let alone maintain and update in a timely manner in line with shift-
ing fundamentals and continuing shocks to the economy.
Hayek’s emphasis on the informational role of prices anticipates the
modern microeconomic literature on rational expectations equilibria.
25
His argument is also relevant for the issue of central bank transparency
and monetary policy. If the central bank aims to manipulate market expec-
tations in its own image, it cannot at the same time expect the market
outcome to serve as the aggregator of the “dispersed bits of incomplete
and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individu-
als possess.” The more important the informational role of prices, the
greater the tension between managing market expectations and learning
from market expectations.
Hayek was not disputing that the central planner may be relatively better
informed than any other particular agent in the economy. Indeed, the central
planner could have an absolute advantage in this respect over any particular
agent. But that is not the point. The point is that prices reveal the collective
wisdom of all agents in the economy, by aggregating the diverse informa-
tion they possess individually. Thus Christina Romer and David Romer’s
ﬁnding that central bank forecasters are better informed than their private
sector counterparts is not sufﬁcient to conclude that the central bank does
not face the dilemma posed above (although, as we will show later, any
formal calculus of the effects must consider the relative informational
prowess of the central bank over the individual agents).
26 The corner shop-
keeper serving a small clientele would be hard pressed to match the
insights of the central bank forecasting department. However, the shop-
keeper is best placed to observe the economic fundamentals ruling in his or
her small sliver of the real world. These small slivers, across geographical
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regions and sectors of the economy, when pieced together in mosaic fashion,
may reveal a far clearer picture than any central planner can hope to achieve.
To be sure, the modern central bank has an awesome array of expertise
and technical resources at its disposal. Sims describes vividly how central
bank forecasts are the culmination of a major logistical effort, drawing
together the results of formal modeling from an array of models as well as
the unquantifiable insights of experts on individual sectors.
27 In this re-
spect, central bank forecasting departments bear some resemblance to the
economic planning ministries that Hayek has in his sights. Hayek argues,
“We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by ﬁrst communicating
all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowl-
edge, issues its orders.”
28 The central bank’s resources and expertise, as
formidable as they are, may fail to match the collective wisdom of the eco-
nomically active population as a whole.
The Double-Edged Nature of Public Information
The fundamental debate over the relative superiority of the market
mechanism versus central planning that raged in Hayek’s time reminds us
that the stakes in the economic debate were once much higher than they are
today. However, some of the lessons from the Hayek-Lange debate are
applicable even in the more modest arena of central bank transparency and
monetary policy. Rather than presenting a stark choice between socialism
and the market economy, the issues arise in the role of public information
in an economy with distributed knowledge—an economy where each
agent has a “window” on the world, each with a slightly different perspec-
tive, and each with a possible relative advantage in ascertaining the truth
about some smaller sliver of the real world.
In general, an individual facing a choice under uncertainty will bene-
fit from gaining greater access to information that reduces the uncer-
tainty, since better information permits actions that are better suited to
the circumstances. This conclusion is unaffected by whether the incre-
mental information is public (in the sense of being shared by everyone)
or private (available only to that individual).
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005But there are reasons why improved public information, although pri-
vately valuable to the decisionmaker receiving it, might not be valuable to
society. If the private information of some market participants is to be re-
vealed to others, that information must be reflected in market outcomes.
But if public information leads market participants to ignore or downplay
their own private information in their actions, the market will reveal less
new information about market conditions. Thus public signals generate an
informational externality.
This effect is further exacerbated if decisionmakers’ interests are inter-
twined in such a way that a decisionmaker is an interested party in the
actions taken by others. Public information in such contexts has attributes
that make it a double-edged instrument. On the one hand, public informa-
tion conveys information concerning the underlying fundamentals, as be-
fore. However, it also serves as a focal point for the beliefs of the group as
a whole and thus serves a powerful coordination role. The “sunspots” liter-
ature has emphasized how even signals that are “extrinsic,” having no
direct bearing on the underlying fundamentals, may nevertheless serve to
coordinate the actions of individual agents because of their very public
nature. To the extent that public information allows coordination on good
outcomes, greater precision of public information may be beneﬁcial. But,
equally, that coordination could be coordination on less desirable out-
comes. With sunspots, some indeterminacy would always rule.
In most cases of interest, public information about monetary policy is
not merely a sunspot, however; it conveys important information concern-
ing the economic fundamentals. The question then is how the coordination
effect of public information will affect the inferences drawn by individual
economic agents, and how their intertwined interests will affect their indi-
vidual incentives and the collective outcome that results from their acting
on these incentives.
When there is the potential for a strong consensus to prevail or a con-
ventional wisdom to take hold, individual incentives may become distorted
in such a way as to reduce the informational value of economic outcomes.
Central bank pronouncements may then serve as a lightning rod, reinforc-
ing the conventional wisdom or consensus and suppressing dissent from
those individuals whose own private signals tell them that the conventional
wisdom is ﬂawed. When individual incentives are thus eroded, the signals
that would otherwise emerge from dissenting voices to undermine the ﬂawed
consensus may be muted, serving to perpetuate the ﬂawed consensus.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 17In an earlier paper,29 we explored the trade-offs that result in such a setting
by examining the outcome of a collective decision problem reminiscent of
Keynes’s celebrated metaphor of the beauty contest. Keynes drew a parallel
between ﬁnancial markets and a form of newspaper competition of his day
that invited readers to pick the six prettiest faces from 100 photographs.
30
Readers won by picking the set of faces that “most nearly corresponds to
the average preferences of the competitors as a whole.” Under these rules,
Keynes noted, a reader would win by anticipating which faces would become
the popular choice, rather than by choosing those that the reader found most
attractive. If individual readers voted on the basis of their own sincerely
held judgments, the aggregate outcome would reveal much about the true
collective judgment of the contestants as a whole. However, the more the
contestants vote on the basis of “anticipating what average opinion expects
average opinion to be,” the more the aggregate vote will reﬂect the outcome
of this second-guessing game among the contestants.
Now imagine how much worse the distortion would be if a widely
watched authority ﬁgure were to weigh in, offering his or her public judg-
ment on the faces in the photographs. The authority’s judgment may or may
not be sound. What counts is that his or her pronouncements reach a wide
audience, and that everyone knows that his or her pronouncements reach a
wide audience. For this reason alone, the authority’s public judgment would
serve as a powerful rallying point around which average opinion could coa-
lesce. Once the public pronouncement has been issued, it would be futile
for any reader to expend effort in scouring the faces in the photographs, to
form an independent opinion of their fundamental attributes. Knowing that
others would likewise regard this as futile and will not gainsay the authority
ﬁgure, such a reader would have little incentive to expend effort in reaching
an independent judgment. The aggregate outcome would thus reveal little
about the genuine collective judgments of the individual contestants, but
instead would be dominated by the public pronouncement. The signal value
of the aggregate vote would thus be severely impaired.
Arguably, central bank transparency raises similar issues. When the cen-
tral bank issues regular pronouncements on the economic outlook and pub-
lishes its forecasts of the output gap and the path of its policy rate, such
pronouncements provide a powerful rallying point around which market
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005
29. Morris and Shin (2002).
30. Keynes (1936).expectations can coalesce. The more market participants consider the beliefs
of other market participants, the greater will be the impact of the central
bank’s pronouncements in determining the aggregate market outcome.
The dilemma for monetary policy transparency is that such pronounce-
ments by the central bank will, invariably, also offer genuine and valuable
insight on the current and future state of the economy. But, however sound
as a guide to the underlying fundamentals, the central bank’s pronounce-
ments are even better as guides to what average opinion will be. As a
result, traders give the opinions of central bankers undue weight and place
less weight on their own independent assessments of the economy. Public
pronouncements can thus crowd out private opinions, and the market may
cease to function as a way of aggregating and revealing diverse, private
judgments about the world in the way that Hayek envisaged.
Most interestingly (and most disturbingly), consider how the problem is
altered when the central bank becomes even better informed. Suppose that
the central bank, in light of the disappointing performance of its forecasts,
decides to beef up its forecasting effort by recruiting yet more experts and
pouring in yet more resources. Paradoxically, the problem may become
worse, not better, when the central bank’s competence in reading the econ-
omy improves. There are two countervailing effects. On the one hand, the
improved ability of the central bank to read the economy will provide better-
quality information to other economic agents. However, the better the cen-
tral bank becomes at reading the economy, the more authority it gains in
the eyes of those other agents. As the central bank’s pronouncements
become more authoritative, its ability to serve as the rallying point for
coordinating market expectations becomes stronger, suppressing further
the channel through which dissenting agents can express their views. The
net effect of improved central bank transparency is thus ambiguous. This is
one aspect of what might be called the “paradox of transparency.”
Elements of a Theory
The simplest way to motivate the problem is in terms of a decision
problem akin to Keynes’s beauty contest, although it will be important to
show how real-world economic decisions can be understood within a sim-
ilar framework. We will return to the economic applications after seeing
how the key effects enter in a simpler, abstract decision.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 19Suppose that there are many small agents, each of whom faces the prob-
lem of tailoring his or her action to the underlying state θ, but also tries to
second-guess the decisions of the other agents. Suppose that each agent i
follows the decision rule
where a – is the average action in the population, and Ei( ) is the expecta-
tions operator for player i. Each agent puts a positive weight on the
expected fundamental state E(θ) and on the expected actions of others and
chooses a weighted average of the two. The parameter r, where 0 < r <1,
indicates the extent to which agent i is motivated by the concern to second-
guess the actions of others. If r is large (close to 1), decisions are inﬂu-
enced predominantly by anticipation of what others do, rather than by one’s
own perception of the fundamentals.
The Public Information Benchmark
In the simplest case, if θ is commonly known, equilibrium entails ai =
θ for all i. When instead agents face uncertainty concerning θ but have
access to a source of information shared by all, their actions approximate
θ most closely when uncertainty is small. Suppose θ is drawn from an
(improper) uniform prior over real numbers, but agents observe the single
public signal
where η is normally distributed and independent of θ, with mean zero and
variance ση
2. The signal y is “public” in the sense that the actual realization
of y is common knowledge among all agents. They choose their actions
after observing the realization of y. Conditional on y, all agents believe
that θ is distributed normally with mean y and variance ση
2. Hence, agent i’s
optimal action is
where ai(y) denotes the action taken by agent i as a function of y. Since
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20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005for all i. The average action is then y, and the distance between ai and θ is
Thus the less noise in the public signal, the closer is the action to the
fundamentals. We will now contrast this with the Hayekian case in which
each agent has his or her own “window on the world.”
The Hayekian Case
Consider now the case where, in addition to the public signal y, agent i
observes the realization of a private signal:
where noise terms  i are normally distributed with zero mean and variance
σ 
2, independent of θ and η, so that E( i j) = 0 for i ≠ j. The private signal
of one agent is not observable by the others; each agent has a privileged
view of his or her own small sliver of the world.
As before, the agents’ decisions are made after observing their signals.
Denote by α and β the precision of the public and the private information,
respectively, where
Then, based on both private and public information, agent i’s expected
value of θ is
One simple way to solve for the equilibrium is to posit that actions are a
linear function of signals. We will follow this with a demonstration that
this linear equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, which also gives important
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Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 21insights into the double-edged nature of public information. Thus, as the
ﬁrst step, suppose that each agent follows a linear rule,
for some constant κ. Then agent i’s conditional estimate of the average
expected action across all agents is
Agent i’s optimal action is
Comparing coefﬁcients in equations 9 and 10, we therefore have
from which we can solve for κ. The equilibrium action ai is given by
and the average action is
First observe that the larger is α, the further away is the average action
from θ. This is true even if r = 0. However, if r > 0, even less weight is put
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22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005Together with Franklin Allen, we have developed this theme in an asset
pricing model where the price of an asset today is the average expectation
of tomorrow’s price.
31 Average expectations fail to satisfy the “law of iter-
ated expectations.” That is to say, the average expectation today of the
average expectation tomorrow of future payoffs is not the same thing as
the average expectation of future payoffs. In a Hayekian environment, the
failure of the law of iterated expectations follows a systematic pattern
that puts too much weight on shared information—conventional wisdom
or other public signals, including past prices. Past prices, in particular,
receive too much weight relative to the statistically optimal weight in a
frictionless world. Given the importance of the failure of the law of iter-
ated expectations, it is illuminating to dwell briefly on how the example
sketched above can be shown to be an example of such a failure.
Higher-Order Beliefs
Recall that agent i’s decision rule is
Substituting and writing E
–
(θ) for the average expectation of θ across
agents, we have
To evaluate this expression, one must solve explicitly for Ei(E –k (θ)).
Recall that agent i’s expected value of θ is
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31. Allen, Morris, and Shin (forthcoming).Now agent i’s expectation of the average expectation of θ across agents is
and the average expectation of the average expectation of θ is
Higher-order expectations put more weight on the (noisy) public informa-
tion at the expense of the truth. Not only does the law of iterated expec-
tations fail; it fails in a systematic way where higher-order expectations are
less informative about θ. By induction we have E –k(θ) = (1 − μk)y + μkθ,
where μ =β /(α+β ), and
This is exactly the unique linear equilibrium we identiﬁed earlier.
Economic Interpretations of the Decision Rule
The decision rule in equation 2, which was motivated by the beauty con-
test analogy, can be given more familiar macroeconomic underpinnings by
appealing to the “island economy” model of Robert Lucas and Edmund
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24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005Phelps,32 although, for reasons to be discussed below, we favor another
interpretation of the decision rule. Suppose that there are a large number
of small islands, which can be interpreted either as distinct geographical
regions or as different sectors of the economy. There is a single good in
this archipelago, and the supply of this good on island i is denote by qi
s.
The supply of the good is increasing in the difference between the price
on island i and the perceived average price across all islands. In particular,
we take the linear supply function
where pi is the price on island i, p – is the average price across all islands, and
b > 0 is a supply parameter. The expectations operator Ei( ) denotes the
expectation with respect to the information available to residents of island i.
The demand for the good on island i is a decreasing linear function of
the price on the island, but it also depends on the best estimate of some
underlying fundamental variable θ. In the original treatment of this prob-
lem by Lucas and Phelps, θ is construed as being the money supply and is
under the central bank’s control. Demand on island i is thus given by
where θ is the money supply. Market clearing then implies
where r = b/(b + 1). This is the pricing rule obtained by Phelps,
33 which
extends the standard Lucas-Phelps island economy model by incorporat-
ing a role for the expectations of prices set on other islands. Thus we re-
trieve the beauty contest decision rule.
Although the outward form of equation 18 conforms to the beauty con-
test decision rule, the fundamental variable θ in the original version of the
island economy model is something that the central bank has full control
over. Thus learning about θ is not an issue, and so the informational role
of prices has no part to play in the analysis.
A more appropriate interpretation of the pricing rule in equation 18 is in
terms of the price-setting decisions of ﬁrms that have some market power
() , 18 1 pr E r E p ii i =− ( ) ( ) + ( ) θ
() , 17 qE p i
d
ii = ( ) − θ
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32. Lucas (1972, 1973); Phelps (1970).
33. Phelps (1983).due to imperfect substitutability between goods.34 In this context θ repre-
sents the underlying marginal cost conditions for the ﬁrms, which also cor-
respond to the output gap under some simplifications.
35 Firms care about
the prices set by other firms because there is price competition across
ﬁrms. Woodford considers pricing rules for ﬁrms of the form
where pi is the (log) price set by ﬁrm i, p is the average price across ﬁrms,
χ is marginal cost (in real terms), and ξ is a constant between 0 and 1.
36
The operator Ei denotes the conditional expectation with respect to ﬁrm i’s
information set. The parameter ξ is related to the elasticity of substitution
between goods, and it becomes small as the economy becomes more com-
petitive.
37 An active literature has developed exploring the Hayekian theme
in the context of an imperfectly competitive economy.
38
Rewriting equation 19 in terms of nominal marginal cost, defined as
θ≡χ+p, we have
yielding another way to derive the beauty contest decision rule.
The examples above pertain to the pricing of goods, but many of the
properties of beauty contests arise also in the context of financial market
pricing. Financial market prices present the additional complication that
they are forward looking: the price today equals the discounted expected
payoff at some future date. Nevertheless, the excessive impact of public
information can be shown, at the cost of some additional apparatus. Allen,
Morris, and Shin derive asset pricing formulas of the form
() , 21 1 pE E E s tt t t h t h t = ⋅⋅⋅ − ++ + θω
() , 20 1 pE p E ii i =− ( ) ( ) + () ξξ θ
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34. Woodford (2003a) has popularized this interpretation of the beauty contest rule.
35. Galí and Gertler (1999).
36. Woodford (2003a).
37. Woodford (2003a). Townsend (1983) discusses similar linear rules but in the con-
text of investment.
38. See Adam (2003), Amato and Shin (forthcoming), Hellwig (2002, 2004), and Ui
(2003). See also Kasa (2000) and Pearlman and Sargent (2005). The latter show how the
problem can sometimes be reduced to the case with common knowledge. Similar issues
arise in the context of asset pricing: see Allen, Morris, and Shin (forthcoming) and Bac-
chetta and Van Wincoop (2003, 2004).where pt is the price of a ﬁnancial asset at time t, θt+h is the fundamental
payoff at time t + h, ω is a constant, and st is the asset supply, with a mean
of zero.
39 Thus the price of an asset today is the average expectation today
of the average expectation tomorrow, and so on, of the eventual realized
fundamentals.
The law of iterated expectations fails also in this context, and the direc-
tion of the failure is toward excessive influence of public information.
Asset pricing applications present some technical difﬁculties, such as the
fact that past (and even current) prices constitute public signals that enter
into the information sets of traders. Thus the innocuous-looking notation
E –
t actually conceals much subtlety.
However, the broad conclusions are the same as for the static beauty
contest. Public information has a disproportionate impact on financial
market prices. The precise sense in which this is true is that the market
price deviates systematically from the average expectation of the funda-
mental value, and the bias is always toward commonly shared informa-
tion, including past prices. More formally,
and the distance between pt and the expectation of θt+h based purely on pub-
lic information is smaller than the distance between E –
tθt+h and the expecta-
tion of θt+h based purely on public information. Thus the key features of the
overreaction to public information apply to ﬁnancial markets also.
The Precision of Endogenous Information
So far we have treated the precision α of public information as given.
But the information available to central banks derives from outcomes in
the economy itself and hence is the result of actions taken by individual
economic agents. To the extent that individuals’ decisions are affected by
public information, we can expect the signal values of the resulting out-
comes to be sensitive to the disclosure regime.
We show that this is indeed the case. The information precision of a cen-
tral bank that issues regular forecasts is lower than that of a central bank
()
,
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39. Allen, Morris, and Shin (forthcoming).that simply tracks the evolution of the fundamentals through its signals. We
postpone a discussion of the potential welfare effects of such impaired sig-
nal precision until the next section, and instead concentrate here on why the
information value deteriorates when a central bank discloses more.
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ { ...,   −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. The fun-
damentals {θt} evolve as a Gaussian random walk:
where {φt} are independent standard normal innovations.
At each date a new generation of private sector actors observe a noisy
signal of the fundamentals as of that date, together with any present and
past disclosures by the central bank. Individual i’s noisy signal in gener-
ation t is given by
where  it are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal
across individuals and across generations with precision β.
We assume a sparse information set for the individual at date t (for
instance, there is no access to the private information of previous genera-
tions). But we do this as a way of setting the basic level of information to
which the central bank can add by disclosing its own estimates and fore-
casts, if it chooses to. Extending the model to encompass richer settings
would be worthwhile for speciﬁc applications.
The private sector agents play a beauty contest game, following the
decision rule
where a –
t is the average action across individuals at date t.
The central bank observes a noisy signal about what the private sector
individuals did in the previous period. At date t that signal is
where {ψt} are i.i.d. Gaussian noise terms independent of all other ran-
dom variables, and with variance 1/γ.
The central bank’s information set at date t is the collection of all past
signals {...,   zt−2, zt−1, zt}. We are interested in the central bank’s informa-
tion precision at date t as measured by
() , 25 1 za tt t =+ − ψ
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28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005Compare two possible regimes. In the ﬁrst the central bank makes no dis-
closures but simply tracks the fundamentals through its signals. In the
second the central bank discloses its best estimates of the fundamentals.
Since the fundamentals follow a random walk, the disclosure of the cen-
tral bank’s estimate of θ is tantamount to issuing forecasts of future val-
ues of θ at all horizons.
The Case without Disclosure
In the ﬁrst case, since there is a continuum of private sector agents, and
they receive i.i.d. signals conditional on the fundamentals, the average
action a –
t fully reveals the true fundamental state θt. Thus the central bank’s
signals are given by
We write z ˆt as the linear estimate of θt based on {zt, zt−1, zt−2, . . .}, and let
αt be the precision of this estimate as measured by 1/Var(θt zt, zt−1, . . .).
Then, on observing zt+1 at date t + 1, the linear estimate of θt is
with precision αt +γ . Since θt+1 =θ t +φ t+1, we have a recursive formula for
the central bank’s information precision over time, namely,
The steady-state information precision in the nondisclosure case is thus
the value of α that solves
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Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 29The Case with Disclosure
In the second case, where the central bank discloses its signals to the
individual agents, the information set of agent i in generation t is
Let z ˆt be the linear estimate of θt based on the central bank’s disclosures
only, and let αt be the precision of this estimate. Then this individual will
take action as follows:
By taking the average across individuals in equation 30, the average
action is
Solving for θt as a function of z ˆt, zt+1,
Thus the incremental information value to the central bank from observing
zt+1 comes from the signal
which is orthogonal to {zτ}τ≤t. The precision of st+1 is
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30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005Since γ ˆt ≤γ , we can conclude that the incremental information value to
the central bank of observing its signal zt+1 is lower in the disclosure case.
Moreover, this incremental information value is lower, the higher was the
central bank’s overall precision αt in the previous period. In other words,
raising the central bank’s overall information precision has the effect of
lowering the value of its subsequent signal. The intuition is that increased
precision at t intensifies the beauty contest and reduces the information
value of the average action. This then lowers the information precision of
the signal arriving at t + 1.
At date t + 1 the central bank’s linear estimate of θt is
with precision αt +γ ˆt. Since θt+1 =θ t +φ t+1, we have a recursive formula
for the central bank’s information precision in the disclosure case:
The steady-state information precision in the disclosure case is the value
of α that solves
Comparing the Regimes
Comparing the steady-state information precision levels in the two
regimes given by equations 28 and 34, we can see that steady-state precision
is lower under the disclosure regime, since the value of the expression in

















































































Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 31values r = 0.85 and β=1,
40 we can plot in ﬁgure 3 the steady-state infor-
mation precision α as a function of the variance 1/γ of the noise term ψ.
The central bank has higher information precision in the nondisclosure
case. In both cases this precision can be raised to the upper bound of 1 by
reducing the variance of the noise, but the disclosure case requires very lit-
tle noise to get close to the upper bound.
It is worth noting that the deterioration of the central bank’s signal value
under the disclosure regime holds even when r = 0, so that there are no
coordination elements, although coordination elements exacerbate the
effect. We return to this issue below.
It is also apparent from the implicit formula in equation 34 for steady-
state α that the central bank’s information precision is a function of the pri-
vate sector agents’ information precision. This is intuitively clear, since
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Figure 3. Precision of Public Information by Type of Regime
a
40. The value r = 0.85 is implied by ξ=0.15 in the imperfect competition interpretation
of the beauty contest rule. See Woodford (2003b) for a discussion of the magnitude of ξ.the central bank learns by observing what the individual agents do. The
reason β enters in this relation is that the aggregate actions α –
t are reveal-
ing only to the extent that private agents put weight on their own private
signals. The more informative their private signals, the greater the infor-
mation value of the aggregate action. In this sense the central bank’s
information value is dependent on (and derivative of) the private sector
agents’ information precision.
Figure 4 plots α as a function of β for varying values of the noise ψt
in the central bank’s signal (holding other parameter values the same as
in figure 3). The central bank’s information precision is increasing in
the private sector’s information precision, but α can lie below β, espe-
cially when β is large. One reason is that, whereas private sector agents
have contemporaneous information about θt from their signals (say, by
observing a signal about their current marginal cost), the central bank’s
signal comes with some delay, and the innovation to θt increases the cen-
tral bank’s uncertainty.










Source: Authors’ calculations using the model described in the text.
a. α is the precision of public information and β the precision of private
information as explained in the text.
Figure 4. Precision of Public and Private Information in Disclosure Regime
aFinally, it is worth noting that the forecasting rule for the central bank
will change if it moves from a nondisclosure regime to a disclosure
regime. Since θt follows a random walk, the linear estimates given by
equations 26 and 32 are also forecasts of all future values of θ. Needless to
say, if the central bank continues to use the old (nondisclosure) forecasting
rule under the new (disclosure) regime, its forecast will be off the mark.
One could view this as a variation of the Lucas critique as applied to cen-
tral bank transparency. The time-series properties of aggregate actions will
change as the disclosure regime changes.
Welfare Effects of Transparency
The impaired signal value for the transparent central bank will impinge
on any control problem that it faces, and it poses greater challenges in
making decisions under uncertainty. Thus the central bank will face a
trade-off between the welfare gains that result from being able to steer the
future beliefs of economic agents, and the impaired signal value that results
from disclosure of its forecasts. Evaluating the terms of such a trade-off is
an important topic for future investigation. Furthermore, the degree of trans-
parency itself emerges as one dimension of the optimal control problem: one
can expect to see a future debate on “optimal transparency.” We believe
these issues to be the key to resolving the welfare effects of transparency in
the spirit of the Hayek-Lange debate.
The debate to date, however, has concentrated on the one-shot model
of beauty contests sketched earlier, where α is taken as given. Although
the current debate sheds no light on the endogenous nature of central bank
information, it is nevertheless illuminating in outlining some of the other
dimensions of the debate.
Welfare Effects in the Static Analysis
Recall that, under the equilibrium decision rule (equation 12), the average










34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005Expressed in terms of basic random variables θ and η, we have
Thus increases in α and increases in r unambiguously reduce the informa-
tiveness of the average action as a signal of θ. In particular, public infor-
mation always reduces the informativeness of average actions, even if r =
0, but strategic complementarities exacerbate the effect. Although we
have not formally modeled the social value of information about θ, we
have focused on the importance of the information aggregation role of
prices in private investment decisions and in the forecasting of the central
bank. The welfare losses come not from coordination itself, but rather from
the externalities imposed by the agents playing the beauty contest on those
other agents who rely on prices to be informationally efficient. There is a
market failure in which agents fail to internalize the externalities flowing
from uninformative prices.
Some recent debates on the social value of information have focused on
the welfare of the coordinating players themselves (rather than their exter-
nal effect on others learning from their actions). In a previous paper we
assumed that the beauty contest element of the individuals’ decision is
socially wasteful, entering only as a zero-sum component in payoffs, so
that social welfare depends only on the variation of individual actions
around θ.
41 In this case social welfare is enhanced only to the extent that
individuals’ actions approximate the fundamental state θ. In such a formu-
lation, increased precision of public information is not guaranteed to raise
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41. Morris and Shin (2002).Welfare is increasing in the precision of the private signals, as we can see
by differentiating equation 36 with respect to β:
However, the derivative of equation 36 with respect to α is
so that
When r > 0.5, there are ranges of the parameters where increased precision
of public information is detrimental to welfare.
If α is restricted to some interval [0, α –] for technical feasibility reasons,
we can expect a corner solution to the optimization of α, in which the
social optimum entails either providing no public information at all (that
is, setting α=0) or providing the maximum feasible amount of public
information (setting α=α –). The better informed is the private sector, the
higher the hurdle rate of the precision of public information that would
make it welfare enhancing.
However, the zero-sum nature of the coordination element in payoffs is
crucial to our 2002 result. If instead the coordination itself has some social
value, the ambiguous effect of α disappears. Woodford describes utility
functions that give rise to the same linear decision rule (equation 2) but
allow for a social value of coordinated action;
42 in this case welfare is no
longer given by equation 36 but rather by
Woodford points out that this function is globally increasing in α, and
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42. Woodford (2005, appendix A).In the same spirit, George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan pro-
pose a microfounded model that incorporates coordination elements in
the welfare function.
43 The coordination element comes from an invest-
ment problem with positive spillover effects, and so an explicit coordina-
tion premium is built into the problem. In particular, the welfare effects are
closely tied to the fact that better public information allows the agents to
eliminate the inefﬁciencies associated with coordination failure.
The coordination element in Hellwig’s analysis is more subtle.
44 Hell-
wig presents a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition
based on the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators for consumption and price. In par-
ticular, the average price for the economy as a whole is given by the index
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods, and pt
i is the
price charged by ﬁrm i at date t. In effect, the average price is a generalized
harmonic mean of prices.
45 This has important consequences. Although
proﬁt is increasing in Pt, it is decreasing in price dispersion, reﬂecting the
fact that the harmonic mean always lies below the arithmetic mean. Thus a
ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt increases when price dispersion is reduced. In turn,
the form of the price index reﬂects the preference for variety implicit in the
Dixit-Stiglitz utility function. For other specifications of preferences, an
alternative perspective is to note that a consumer’s indirect utility (util-
ity as a function of prices at the optimum) is a convex function of prices,
reﬂecting the ability of consumers to switch away from expensive goods in
favor of cheaper ones. Price dispersion then has a beneficial effect. It
would be desirable to understand more generally how welfare effects in
Hellwig’s model depend on attitudes to price dispersion.
Our original results are thus sensitive to the microfoundation given to the
coordination motive. We highlighted this sensitivity in the online appendix
to our 2002 paper.
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43. Angeletos and Pavan (2004).
44. Hellwig (2004).
45. More accurately, it is the power mean with a negative power. See, for instance,
mathworld.wolfram.com/HarmonicMean.html.
46. Morris and Shin (2002); the online appendix is at www.e-aer.org/data/dec02_app_
morris.pdf.uniﬁed analysis of the value of public information strategic problems with
quadratic payoff.
47 Their analysis makes use of a comparison of equilib-
rium behavior with an “efﬁcient” outcome, corresponding to a constrained
planner’s problem, where the planner can mandate players’ actions as a
function of their signals but cannot observe the signals. Their analysis high-
lights that the results in our 2002 paper rely on both the lack of externalities
in payoffs and that the equilibrium involves an inefﬁciently high level of
coordination. Thus continuing work on the welfare analysis of public
information with a microfounded coordination motive is clearly valuable.
However, we have emphasized elsewhere in this paper that the dynamic
effects of information revelation may be important and that one should not
rely too heavily on the one-shot version of the beauty contest model in
drawing conclusions about the desirability of greater transparency.
Relative Precision
In a reply to our 2002 paper, Lars Svensson raises another issue.48 Tak-
ing our payoffs at face value, he makes two observations. First, the result
that welfare is locally decreasing in the precision of public information
holds only with restrictions on the information parameters that are empiri-
cally very restrictive (α has to be small relative to β). Second, even on a
global analysis, when the precision of the public signal is no lower than that
of the private signal, welfare is higher with the public signal than without it.
Svensson’s point can be explained by referring back to welfare as given
by equation 36, but expressed as a function of α. Let us denote this by
V(α). Thus,
On the assumption that withholding the public signal is equivalent to
setting α=0, the ex ante welfare in the absence of the public signal is thus
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47. Angeletos and Pavan (2005).
48. Svensson (forthcoming).There is a hurdle rate α – for the precision of the public signal such that
welfare with the public signal is lower than welfare without it if and only
if α < α –. The hurdle rate is the value of α that solves V(α) = V(0) and is
given by
Since 0 < r < 1, the hurdle rate is lower than the precision β of the private
information. Thus, for the benchmark case where the precision of public
information is no lower than that of private information (that is, where α≥β ),
welfare is higher with the public signal than without it.
Without taking fully into account the endogenous nature of α, it would
be difﬁcult to come to a ﬁrm conclusion on the relative sizes of α and β.
We can see from figure 3 above that, when good public information
depends on a high precision of private information, choosing one has
implications for the other.
The evidence from Romer and Romer that the Federal Reserve’s Green-
book forecasts outperform the forecasts of the Federal Reserve’s private
sector counterparts is often cited as evidence that α is greater than β.
49
However, private sector forecasters are not the typical “economic agent”
studied in most economic models. Rather they are special types of agents
who try to mimic the central bank’s decision problem, but with fewer
resources. Thus β should be understood to refer to the information preci-
sion of genuine economic agents who learn about the current state of the
economy from their own transactions. For instance, in the price setting
game version of the beauty contest rule, each economic agent is a ﬁrm try-
ing to balance the competitive effects of price changes with the need to
keep price above marginal cost. Here β is the precision of the ﬁrm’s esti-
mate of its own marginal cost. The stylized model in our 2002 paper also
suffers from the fact that it imposes independence of the signals condi-
tional on θ. The online appendix to that paper dealt with a more general
case that allows for correlated signals, and Morris, Shin, and Hui Tong pre-
sent an example, in a reply to Svensson,
50 showing the variety of welfare
effects that may arise away from the simple benchmark case, and in partic-
ular that public information may be damaging even at high levels of public
precision.
() . 44 2 1 αβ =− ( ) r
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49. Romer and Romer (2000).
50. Morris, Shin, and Tong (forthcoming).The debates formulated in the static model have extended our under-
standing along several dimensions, but the limited nature of the static frame-
work and the sensitivity of the results to the assumed payoffs suggest that we
have come close to the limits of useful debate within the confines of such
a restrictive framework. Much more important would be the endogenous
nature of public information precision itself. It is this issue that lies at the
heart of the debate between Hayek and his socialist contemporaries, and the
largest stakes in the monetary policy transparency debate lie here.
Implications for Monetary Policy
One of the pitfalls of engaging in any debate is that of overselling one’s
case and making possibly untenable claims. The dangers are large, espe-
cially if the issue is something as basic and desirable as the transparency
of a prominent and influential public institution. Thus it is worth taking
a deep breath and a larger perspective. The arguments presented in this
paper do not address the question of whether any particular forecast or
other information should or should not be disclosed. Rather, the objective
has been to review arguments about the trade-offs involved in the choice
of framework for communicating with diverse economic actors. Nor do
we claim that transparency (or inflation targeting, or publication of fore-
casts) is undesirable. Our aim is the much more modest one of drawing
attention to the two-sided nature of the debate.
Transparency affords considerable leverage to central bankers in inﬂu-
encing the beliefs of economic agents. But this in turn may reduce the sig-
nal value of private sector actions. The Bank of England’s recent experience
provides a glimpse into the difﬁculties faced by a central bank when it has
poor information on the current state of the economy. At its August 2005
meeting the Monetary Policy Committee voted by a majority of ﬁve to four
to lower the policy rate. The minutes of the meeting represent the views of
the members who voted against the cut as follows:
For these members, there appeared to be little risk in waiting for further data.
Given the difﬁculty in explaining a reversal of a decision soon after a turning
point, should that prove necessary in the light of future data, it was advisable to
accumulate a little more evidence than usual before changing interest rates.51
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51. www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2005/index.htm, p. 9.The uncertainty about the current state of the economy clearly played
on the minds of all members. Uncertainty as to where the economy actu-
ally was at the time was also a prominent theme at the press conference
following the publication of the August 2005 Inﬂation Report.
52
To the extent that uncertainty about current conditions makes forecast-
ing more difﬁcult, another telltale sign of a drop in signal values would be
a deterioration in forecasting performance. Of course, such a deterioration
cannot be seen as a clinching argument for a drop in signal values (there
may be other culprits), but we have seen that changes in the disclosure
regime are associated with changes in the time-series properties of aggre-
gate outcomes, as well as changes in the signal value of those outcomes.
When poor signal values conspire with structural change in the economy,
forecasting will be extremely difficult. Thus forecasting failures would
certainly be consistent with a drop in signal values. There is some recent
evidence of a deterioration in the forecasting accuracy of central banks and
their private sector counterparts.
53
At the Federal Reserve, the staff of the Board of Governors prepares
a detailed forecast before each scheduled meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). The purpose of this forecast, known as the
Greenbook, is to serve as background to the deliberations in the FOMC,
and the views expressed are those of the staff rather than individual com-
mittee members. Sims provides a detailed description of the process by
which the Greenbook forecasts are arrived at.
54 The forecasts are posted on
the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, except for the
most recent ﬁve-year window, which remains conﬁdential. Peter Tulip’s
study therefore uses the publicly disclosed data that include forecasts of
outcomes up to the end of 2001.
55
Tulip ﬁnds that, even as output ﬂuctuations have moderated substantially
in recent years,
56 forecast errors have not. The fact that policy responses
are endogenous and that output fluctuations have moderated both make
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52. A video of the press conference is available at the Bank of England website,
www.bankofengland.co.uk.
53. The evidence is documented in Schuh (2001) and Campbell (2004) for private sec-




56. The moderation in output fluctuations has been documented by McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000), Kim and Nelson (1999), and Blanchard and Simon (2001).forecasting more difﬁcult. Nevertheless, it is notable from Tulip’s study that
the performance of longer-term forecasts for output (up to eight quarters) has
not been encouraging. Since the late 1980s, mean squared prediction errors
have been similar to, and sometimes greater than, the variance itself. In
other words, the simple sample mean (the most naïve forecast) has proved
a more accurate guide to GDP growth than the actual forecasts, which is to
say that the forecasts have had negative predictive value.
One way to picture this is to consider a regression of the two-year
change in GDP on a constant and the corresponding forecast. This regres-
sion has a negative coefﬁcient when estimated on the last ten years of the
sample (1992 to 2001). C. Goodhart reports ﬁndings for the Bank of Eng-
land’s forecast performance, which demonstrate a similar lack of predic-
tive power for longer-term forecasts, but Goodhart points out that, when
the central bank acts on the forecasts themselves, the lack of correlation
between the initial forecast and the final outcome should be expected.
57
Sean Campbell reports results from private sector forecasts and ﬁnds that
short-term forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters have a neg-
ative R-squared over the period 1984–2003, echoing Tulip’s result for the
Federal Reserve.
58
If the central bank does not recognize that signal values are impaired in a
world of managed expectations, it may be lulled into a false sense of secu-
rity when in fact imbalances are building in the economy. Even though con-
sumer goods prices may be stable and the flows in the IS curve are well
behaved, asset prices may be buoyed by excessively lax credit conditions,
building up problems for the future despite no obvious signs of trouble.
If inﬂation targeting is practiced ﬂexibly, the output costs of ﬁnancial
distress could ﬁgure in the overall calculations. Less easy to overcome
would be the political economy hurdles facing a central bank’s monetary
policy committee whose mandate is interpreted narrowly as inflation
and output stabilization over a relatively short horizon. The key issue is
whether a monetary policy committee that suspects that imbalances are
building up under the radar feels that it can justify departing from the inﬂa-
tion target over the targeting horizon in order to forestall larger problems
over a longer horizon.
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57. Goodhart (2004).
58. Campbell (2004).Australia provides one recent instance where a central bank has acted to
lean against the wind, raising interest rates and then keeping them high in
the face of an overheating residential property market, even though con-
sumer prices and output were well behaved. The Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia (RBA) came under considerable criticism for acting beyond its
mandate: critics claimed that it was looking “beyond its horizon” of two
years in targeting inﬂation. By taking such actions, the RBA was undoubt-
edly risking its own reputation, since the politically more expedient path
would have been to stick to a more narrow interpretation of its mandate. In
the event, the RBA’s preemptive actions proved well advised, and its rep-
utation has been enhanced. Thus, in practice, central bankers have adapted
well to the new inﬂation targeting regime, and debates are frequently con-
ducted in broader terms.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to broach the larger topic of central
bank accountability. Transparency in this broader sense is crucial for
establishing and maintaining the political legitimacy of the central bank as
a public institution.
59 But there is a potential paradox of transparency. One
of the inevitable fruits of the success in inﬂuencing beliefs is that the cen-
tral bank has to rely on less informative signals to guide its decisions. If
policymakers are to consolidate the successes achieved to date, they will
have to turn their attention to how monetary policy should be conducted in
an era when prices are less informative.
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59. Geraats (2002) gives a taxonomy of the different types of transparency.Comments and 
Discussion
Benjamin M. Friedman: A ﬁrm belief in the miraculous healing power
of central bank transparency is a core tenet of the new religion that the eco-
nomics of monetary policy has somehow become. In the rush to dissociate
themselves from the long-standing practices of their predecessors (and,
one sometimes suspects, to avoid talking about their actual policy deci-
sions), central bankers today tirelessly repeat the mantra that open commu-
nication with the public is fundamental to carrying out their assigned task.
Economists reiterate the same conviction, albeit with little or no more ana-
lytical grounding to indicate just why, or how, enhanced transparency
delivers the wonders claimed for it.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin, in an interesting series of papers,
have ventured the heresy that perhaps, under some conceivable circum-
stances, less transparency might be better than more. The question is
plainly worth consideration. But wholly apart from whatever answer they
may provide to the question of how much transparency is “just right,” the
potential value of Morris and Shin’s work lies in the effort to spell out how
central bank transparency matters in the ﬁrst place. That alone would con-
stitute a signiﬁcant contribution to the discussion.
Morris and Shin nicely situate their inquiry within the broader setting
of economic theory by appealing to the debate, which they personify in
Hayek and Lange, over the informative value of prices. To understand
how the beneficial value of central bank transparency has come to be
such a core belief of current-day monetary economics, however, I think
it is also useful to situate this subject in the context of the still broader
debate over the social optimality of unfettered private market behavior.
44Monetary policy has always presented something of a challenge in this
regard. Even such dedicated free-market advocates as Milton Friedman
have strongly defended the central bank’s role as a necessary deus ex
machina, exogenously fixing some economic magnitude (for Milton
Friedman it was the money stock; today we more typically think of a
short-term interest rate, although this is problematic in yet other ways)
so as to anchor the nominal price level. The nominal price level is not a
matter of economic significance, but rather a convention: a social arti-
fact. Hence private markets require some outside agent to establish its
basis. Since the provision of a monetary standard (itself a social artifact)
is traditionally a well-recognized responsibility of the state, the role of
anchoring the system of nominal prices inherent in a monetary economy
likewise falls to the state, or more typically to one of its constituent
agencies.
The resulting tension between belief in the social optimality of unfet-
tered private market outcomes and the required reliance on a govern-
ment agency is an underlying theme that pervades the writings not only
of Milton Friedman but of countless others in this vein as well. Much of
the literature dealing with monetary policy consists of pointing out how
poor decisions on the part of the government, in this case the central bank,
have brought about this slump, or that inflation, or whatever other eco-
nomic misfortune might have occurred. The source of the tension is that
the standard laissez-faire remedy—simply have the government go out
of business—is unavailable in this setting because of the need to establish
the nominal price level. Apart from advocates of free banking, who have
always remained on the fringe of the subject, the normal form of analysis
in this ﬁeld therefore consists of comparing actual central bank practice
against some designated alternative.
Today’s focus on central bank transparency is a further dimension of
the ongoing effort to attribute whatever plainly nonoptimal economic
outcomes occur to government action, rather than to any failure of opti-
mality on the part of private market activity. In this case it is private
actions that are nonoptimal, not government actions, but the argument is
that it is the government that leads private economic agents to make
mistakes. This avenue for ﬁnding the government at fault is especially
appealing within the new approach to thinking about monetary policy
according to which central banks never do anything anyway—at least not
anything that matters. Instead, only what the central bank says—the
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Shin lies squarely within this particular line of literature. As I shall argue,
however, while the “management of expectations” orientation provides
the setting for Morris and Shin’s analysis, it also sharply limits what that
analysis can accomplish.
The crucial issue, as Morris and Shin portray it, is monetary policy-
makers’ need to learn about the state of the economy. They do so by
observing market prices set by private economic agents acting atomisti-
cally in markets. But those agents’ actions in turn depend on what the cen-
tral bank tells them, and hence so too do the prices that they collectively
establish. As a result, it is at least conceivable—and the burden of Morris
and Shin’s analysis is to show how this can happen—for the central bank
to weaken the information value of the prices that policymakers observe by
disclosing too much about what the policymakers themselves think. In
other words, it is possible to be too transparent.
Although the formal optimizing model on which the private agents rely
is merely sketched out, the intuition behind this result is clear enough.
Each private market participant has access to two sources of information
about whatever matters in the economy: what he or she sees individually,
and the publicly available statements of the central bank. The right infer-
ence to draw is some appropriately weighted combination of the two. But
the more weight private agents place on what the central bank says in
forming their expectations and acting accordingly, the less information is
conveyed to policymakers by the prices that these agents’ actions collec-
tively determine. In the limit, market-determined prices completely lose
their function as an aggregator of the disparate information that private
market participants individually observe.
The conception of a market that Morris and Shin deploy for purposes of
this analysis is Keynes’s famous “beauty contest,” in which, importantly,
nothing of objective signiﬁcance is involved. Each participant simply tries
to guess which contestant (or, in the analogy Keynes had in mind, which
company’s stock) will be judged most attractive by the greatest number of
other participants. As Morris and Shin explain, such a mechanism is sub-
ject to multiple equilibria, and it is easy to see how some deus ex machina
could inﬂuence at which equilibrium the market will settle. But, to repeat,
the greater is the inﬂuence that the deus ex machina exerts, the less the
resulting equilibrium reveals about any underlying preferences or informa-
tion the participants actually have.
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emerges so readily from the “management of expectations” view of mone-
tary policy—consider an alternative conception of a market: a “real estate”
model. Instead of judging which is the prettiest face, participants now
attempt to guess which parcels of a town’s real estate are most likely to be
developed in a way that will enhance their economic value. And in place
of a central bank that doesn’t do anything, but merely says what it thinks,
the deus ex machina is now a well-ﬁnanced developer who, with some
probability, will purchase and develop one or more of the relevant parcels.
Here, again, whatever information and preferences private participants
bring to the market are potentially of value. The market is again subject to
multiple equilibria. Whatever view is expressed by the deus ex machina
can again inﬂuence the market to settle at one equilibrium rather than
another. But now this inﬂuence follows from the probability that the deus
ex machina—the developer—will take an action that objectively matters
for the outcome.
In the world of monetary policymaking, a central bank’s statements
about the future are subject to a certain tension that the difference between
these two models illustrates, regardless of whether such statements are
issued publicly or are merely part of the central bank’s internal deliber-
ations: Is what is being said a prediction of what policymakers think will
happen? Or is it an expression of policymakers’ preferences about what
should happen? Indeed, is there any distinction between the two?
When policy actions affect outcomes with a delay, as monetary policy
actions do, the answer is trivial for horizons shorter than the operative lag.
Any such statements are obviously predictions. But, for longer horizons
over which policy actions could be inﬂuential, why would a policymaker
predict an outcome other than what he or she prefers (conditioned, of
course, on all relevant constraints and externally driven factors)? To put
the question the other way around, if the policymaker saw a particular out-
come as the likely consequence of one sequence of policy actions, but pre-
ferred a different outcome also within the feasible set, why would he or she
not switch to a new sequence of actions in order to achieve it? Such a line
of questioning lies outside the Morris-Shin analysis because the “beauty
contest” model on which they rely, in keeping with the “management of
expectations” view of monetary policy, does not admit of central bank
actions, as distinct from announcements, in the ﬁrst place. It is telling that
Morris and Shin see the entire point of the central bank’s having better
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The concern they raise is that “Public pronouncements can thus crowd out
private opinions.” But when the central bank indicates what it will in fact
do, and when the actions it is going to take will shape the relevant eco-
nomic outcomes, its public pronouncements about the part of the economic
future that it will thereby affect should “crowd out private opinions.”
Shifting the ground of the analysis to this broader conception of mone-
tary policy, in which the central bank does have the ability to take actions
that matter for the economy, in no way makes the question Morris and
Shin are addressing disappear. For example, if the central bank’s sole
objective were to keep inﬂation as close as possible to 2 percent a year, and
market participants had conﬁdence both in the central bank’s commitment
to this monocular objective and in its ability to achieve it (at least on aver-
age over time), then at least one element of private sector expectations—
what do people expect the medium- to long-run inﬂation rate to be?—is no
longer available to inform policymakers’ decisionmaking.
But stating the problem in this way places a different, and more famil-
iar, cast on the matter. A fundamental economic principle, familiar in the
economics of monetary policy and elsewhere, is that one cannot control
both price and quantity in a market that clears. In the 1970s and 1980s,
when many central banks debated whether to formulate and implement
monetary policy in terms of interest rates or money growth, a standard fea-
ture of that discussion was the realization that whichever one the central
bank chose would then be unavailable as an informative signal: policy-
makers obviously cannot learn anything from observing the level of an
interest rate that they have set themselves, nor (subject to complications
associated with imperfect control mechanisms) can they do so from
observing movements of the money stock that they have themselves cho-
sen. Correspondingly, if the central bank solely targets inﬂation, and does
so credibly, it of course renders medium- and long-term inﬂation expecta-
tions uninformative. The same would be true for the output gap if a central
bank could credibly target output some small but safe distance below the
(presumably varying) full-employment level.
To be sure, one could reintroduce the Morris-Shin line of inquiry into
this kind of thinking as well: What if the central bank targeted inﬂation,
and credibly had the ability to make good on its objective, but refused to
announce its target? Yes, the public’s medium- and long-run inflation
expectations would then not just mirror back the central bank’s own target.
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005But presumably they would have far more to do with private agents’
guesses about the undisclosed target than with anything concerning what
they know—and what policymakers would like to learn from them—about
underlying economic conditions. Although there may well be a case to be
made for limiting the transparency of the monetary policy process, I sus-
pect it is unlikely to revolve around any supposed beneﬁts to be had from
concealing policymakers’ intentions for the central trajectory of policy or
the economy.
(What might be an example of a case for limited transparency? The one
that comes most immediately to mind involves contingency planning.
What if the central bank fears, but does not see as highly likely, some
adverse outcome and discusses in advance what actions it would take
should the problem materialize? Would learning about these contingency
plans reassure market participants that any such problem would be ade-
quately met? Or would the mere fact that the discussion had taken place—
that policymakers saw the problem as sufﬁciently likely to warrant talking
about it—be unsettling?)
My reading of the recent discussion of central bank transparency,
including not only the nascent academic literature but also the profusion of
pious utterances on the subject by practicing central bankers, is that the
whole subject matters far less than either casual or attentive readers and
listeners are led to believe. The case for limiting transparency, as argued
by Morris and Shin, is not persuasive at any practical level. Indeed, the
closest they come to saying something about the actual conduct of mone-
tary policy—raising the admittedly hard question of whether policymakers
should respond to potentially destabilizing movements of asset prices even
when both goods-and-services inﬂation and real output are behaving as
expected and desired—actually has nothing to do with the analysis in their
paper. But the repeated claims by others of the practical beneﬁts of trans-
parency are not persuasive either. For the most part, they are either efforts
by academic economists to show that socially undesired outcomes cannot
be the fault of private market activity, or attempts by central bankers to
change the topic of conversation.
Let me conclude by addressing two aspects of the broader policy
debate that constitutes the setting of Morris and Shin’s paper: speciﬁcally,
whether the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank, the Bank
of Japan, and other central banks that have not adopted some form of
explicit inﬂation targeting for the conduct of their monetary policy should
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First, the economic beneﬁts recorded to date by existing inﬂation-targeting
regimes are, at best, still at issue. For example, inﬂation in the United
States in recent years has been low and stable, and output ﬂuctuations have
been relatively muted. Yet the Federal Reserve has not been targeting inﬂa-
tion, at least not in any way that involves public announcements of the kind
that Morris and Shin (following the rest of the literature) emphasize.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve has resisted numerous calls to adopt an explicit
inflation-targeting framework; that is precisely what the debate is about.
What then accounts for the favorable performance of U.S. inﬂation and
output? And how does one know that whatever has delivered these beneﬁts
in the United States has not also done so elsewhere, including in countries
where the central bank has adopted inﬂation targeting? Numerous empiri-
cal researchers have investigated just these questions, but the results have
been mixed. For example, the paper by Ball and Sheridan that Morris and
Shin cite concludes that “Once one controls for regression to the mean,
there is no evidence that inﬂation targeting improves performance . . . as
measured by the behavior of inﬂation, output, and interest rates.”
Second, as Morris and Shin make clear, a major theme in the debate
over inﬂation targeting is the desirability of monetary policy transparency.
Much of the discussion of this subject proceeds from the assumption that
inﬂation-targeting regimes are more transparent than other ways of con-
ducting monetary policy. I believe this assumption is false, however, at
least in regard to how inﬂation targeting is actually practiced today (and
this is, as well, the object of Morris and Shin’s interest).
The issue here is multiple policy objectives. As is well known—and as
Lars Svensson’s work in particular makes clear—inﬂation targeting does
not imply that the rate of inﬂation is necessarily, or even probably, the sole
objective of monetary policy. But how can a central bank that also has
preferences with regard to output or employment, or the economy’s inter-
national balance, or any of the variety of other aspects of economic activ-
ity with which a central bank may plausibly be concerned, go about being
transparent about the objectives it is pursuing in its monetary policy?
One thing it could do—and that Svensson has repeatedly proposed—is
to be explicit about its policy framework by stating publicly its objectives
as well as the constraints it sees itself facing as it pursues those objectives.
But few central banks that practice inﬂation targeting do this. Instead inﬂa-
tion targeting is more often a procedure under which the central bank,
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inflation if pressed very hard to do so, normally goes to great lengths to
conceal any objectives other than inﬂation—for example, by titling its
public reports on monetary policy “inﬂation reports,” as if inﬂation were
the only aspect of the economy that mattered for policy purposes, or by
issuing public statements that typically make no mention of any tension,
at any horizon, between the bank’s inflation goal and its other economic
aims. The resulting “transparency” is like that of polarized glass: one
dimension of what the central bank is doing is fully transparent, or at least
as transparent as one dimension of a multiobjective optimization problem
can be when treated in isolation, while the other is fully opaque.
The reason for raising this familiar issue here is that the distinction
between what the central bank is and is not transparent about is relevant to
Morris and Shin’s interpretation of other researchers’ empirical ﬁndings as
they bear on the more central aims of this paper. Morris and Shin point to
the erosion of forecasting accuracy that some researchers have reported for
recent years, in one country or another, as evidence that when the central
bank tells market participants what to think about the future, those partic-
ipants put less effort into processing the other information at their dis-
posal. An alternative interpretation is that when the central bank discloses
its objectives for inﬂation but conceals its objectives for real economic
outcomes—indeed, pretends that those other objectives do not exist—it is
hardly surprising that real outcomes become harder to predict. Either way,
it is important not to claim for any policymaking regime, even inﬂation tar-
geting, virtues that it does not possess.
Christopher A. Sims: The economics of information has provided many
examples of models that display conﬂicting and paradoxical results. This
reﬂects the fact that information does not ﬁt well within the usual paradigm
of economic analysis, namely, a world populated by constantly optimizing,
completely rational agents whose actions are guided by market prices.
Information, although in some sense marketed, is not an ordinary com-
modity. Although it can be costly to acquire, it can be disseminated at zero
social cost. Although valuable, it is difﬁcult to sell, because it so easily
becomes available to people who have not paid for it yet can observe the
actions of people who have. There are many reasons, therefore, to think
that markets cannot be expected to guide the acquisition and dissemination
of information in an optimal manner.
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because of the difﬁculty of appropriating its value once it is produced. 
Jack Hirshleifer, in a classic paper,
1 showed that, because information
acquired earlier than others acquire it may have a private value that exceeds
its social value, it may instead be overproduced in equilibrium. A standard
idea, going back at least to the article by Hayek that this paper cites, is that
markets are efﬁcient aggregators and transmitters of information. The arti-
cle by Sanford Grossman that they also cite shows that the public signal
that market prices provide destroys the incentive for agents to expend
resources acquiring information.
2 Efﬁcient allocation therefore in general
requires frictions that imply that prices do not perfectly aggregate informa-
tion and that information ﬂows by routes other than only through prices.
This paper by Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin explains an interest-
ing paradox in information economics that has received attention in the
recent literature, starting with the authors’ own seminal work in the area.
Public provision of information that is of higher quality than that produced
by any private agent can reduce the efﬁciency of allocation by reducing the
incentive for agents to act on their own information and thereby reducing
the informativeness of prices. My view is that this paradox is well worth
understanding and keeping in mind when evaluating government programs
devoted to information gathering and dissemination. In this context it has
to stand beside a number of other paradoxes and difﬁculties that make the
straightforward cost-benefit accounting approach to evaluating govern-
ment data dissemination programs inapplicable.
3
But, although this paper and the formal models it contains are best thought
of as applying to government programs to disseminate data, the paper’s
title and much of its informal discussion suggest that its ideas apply to mon-
etary policy, and to inﬂation targeting in particular. This seems to me quite
far-fetched. It reﬂects a failure to make an important distinction between, on
the one hand, dissemination of information about policy actions that the
government cannot avoid taking, and, on the other hand, dissemination by
the government of information about the state of the private economy.
A central bank can make choices about which nominal value it wants to
control—it can be an aggregate price index, an exchange rate, a monetary
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1. Hirshleifer (1971).
2. Grossman (1976).
3. Committee on National Statistics (1985, chapter III).aggregate, or Alan Greenspan’s current judgment of the level of inﬂation-
ary pressure. But there is no laissez-faire option here. A central bank is not
a planning board that can either set prices by computer, substituting for the
market, or let the market do it. It is a government agency that must take
some actions that are relevant to private decisions, and either it can try to
dispel uncertainty about what actions it has taken and will take, or it can
maintain public uncertainty about its operations and policies. It is true that,
in the course of explaining how it chooses the actions that it must take,
it may provide information about its own evaluation of other sources of
uncertainty, unless it acts without looking at these sources of uncertainty.
Morris and Shin are suggesting that this release of information may be so
important and deleterious a side effect of central bank openness as to jus-
tify maintaining secrecy about the central bank’s policy actions.
Morris and Shin write about central bank transparency reducing the
“signal value of prices.” This is misleading language. Any policy that suc-
ceeds in making ﬂuctuations in the price level small will almost inevitably
reduce the “signal value” of the average price level. The macroeconomics
literature is full of models in which this is a highly desirable outcome,
because only relative prices—not the price level—matter for allocation, and
eliminating uncertainty about the course of the price level increases both
the precision of private estimates of relative prices and the incentives for
private agents to accumulate information about local prices and conditions.
the lucas-phelps model. The only model laid out in the paper that
has a central bank determining a numeraire price is the Lucas-Phelps
islands model. It is true that that model has the structure of the public-
private information games that Morris and Shin discuss. But since the
monetary authority determines the price level in that model, there is, as
they acknowledge, a simple prescription for optimal policy: the central
bank should announce what it is doing. It thereby provides perfect public
information, which is always optimal in these setups.
The Lucas-Phelps model turned out to represent a short branch on the
tree of subsequent research, precisely because it generated real effects of
monetary policy only by assuming that agents could not observe directly
what the monetary authority was doing. As soon as one introduces agents
who can read about the money stock every week, or the federal funds rate
every day, all real effects of monetary policy disappear in that model.
Recently there has been interest in rational inattention models, in which
agents, because of limited capacity to process information, do not make
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framework, something like a Lucas-Phelps model can emerge. However,
in such a framework the abstraction, common to all the work that has built
on the Morris and Shin framework, that there is a ﬁxed “private informa-
tion” cost schedule, does not make sense. In fact, because any effort that
capacity-limited agents expend on trying to extract information about
imperfectly observed randomness in monetary policy is effort that cannot
be devoted to evaluating the state of local markets, the case for trans-
parency is likely to be stronger in a rational inattention framework.
Some have integrated the Morris-Shin public-private information setup
into standard “micro-founded” macroeconomic models. The authors men-
tion most of these models, but it perhaps bears more emphasis that, in all of
these setups, increased public information turns out to be welfare improving.
INFLATION TARGETING. Inﬂation targeting as it is actually practiced
amounts to the central bank making projections roughly two years ahead
of the likely path of inﬂation and, in most cases, output growth. These pro-
jections are published two to four times a year, in a document that explains
the central bank’s view of the current state of the economy and of the rea-
soning behind at least its current policy actions. (Two central banks, in
New Zealand and Norway, also display and discuss estimates of future set-
tings of the policy rate.) Inflation targeting represents an attempt to cred-
ibly establish that the central bank is committed to maintaining price
stability. It has several advantages over previously proposed commitment
devices, such as constant money growth, exchange rate targets, or alge-
braic formulas (“rules”) connecting current policy actions to observed
variables. One advantage is that it is believable that the central bank,
and the government more generally, care directly about inflation. Thus,
if unforeseen events force a deviation from the inflation target, a central
bank announcement that this was unintentional, accompanied by a plan
of action for returning to the target, is more believable than such an
announcement would be if the target were, say, money growth. Inflation
may still turn out high and output growth low, encouraging doubt about
the strength of the central bank commitment. But this will be far less severe
than the doubts that must arise about commitment to a money growth target
if money growth is high, while both inﬂation and output growth are low.
Advocates of inﬂation targeting hope and expect that it will result in
expectations of future inﬂation remaining close to the target level, even
when there are short-run deviations from target. There is some evidence
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If private sector inﬂation expectations were thus anchored, while actual
inﬂation deviated sharply from those expectations, there might be concern
that private sector forecasts were deteriorating in quality because of too great
a focus on the announced targets. This does not seem to be what is happen-
ing in inﬂation-targeting countries, however. The private sector is accurately
anticipating that inﬂation will remain stable. The fact that this seems to be
happening is, of course, not evidence of any deleterious effects whatsoever
on private sector forecasts or estimates of the current state of the economy.
“OVERREACTIONS.” The bond markets are very interested in what the
Federal Reserve is going to do with interest rates. In periods when the Fed-
eral Reserve has announced that it is trying to control a monetary aggre-
gate, therefore, news about the values of those aggregates has a big effect
on bond markets. This has no implications at all, however, for whether
there are externalities of the type that Morris and Shin need for their story.
They refer to this pattern as an overreaction of bond markets, but they give
no evidence that this is anything more than markets correctly incorporating
new information about the likely path of monetary policy. Monetary tar-
geting does indeed create uncertainty about interest rates, because of the
volatility of money demand, and this is reﬂected in bond markets being
less stable under such a regime. This is one of the arguments for why inﬂa-
tion targeting is an improvement on monetary targeting. So this is another
piece of anecdotal evidence that in fact adds no weight at all to the authors’
case against central bank transparency.
EVIDENCE FROM DATA REVISIONS. The particular shape of the fan
charts that the authors reproduce from the Bank of England inflation
reports is no doubt related to uncertainty connected to data revisions. The
August report itself has a discussion of data revisions, pointing out that
they are related to the difﬁculty of getting accurate current estimates of ser-
vice sector output. The Bank of England uses survey data as a check on the
preliminary data it receives, and in August 2005 it argued that there was an
unusually large discrepancy between the survey-based estimates and the
preliminary data. Probably the square-shouldered shape of the August fan
chart reﬂects this analysis. There is no indication in the Bank’s own dis-
cussion that data revisions are getting larger, except possibly for a trend
toward a larger service component in output.
CHANGES IN FORECAST ACCURACY. The paper cites several studies
that are supposed to show a decline in forecast accuracy of central bank
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it is largely consistent with the others, and focuses speciﬁcally on changes
in accuracy over time. Its conclusion is that forecast accuracy has improved
signiﬁcantly at horizons up to four quarters or so, that it has deteriorated
noticeably for forecasts at an eight-quarter horizon, but that the deteriora-
tion at this long horizon is nowhere near statistically signiﬁcant.
What is clear is that the overall variance of output growth has declined
and that this decline has been concentrated in the predictable component of
output growth. Note that this is exactly what would be expected from
improved monetary policy if monetary policy can inﬂuence short-run ﬂuc-
tuations but cannot do much about the overall shape of business cycles or
long-run growth. The conclusion must be that there is no reliable evidence
of any decline in central bank forecast accuracy, that there is reliable evi-
dence of improvement in short-run central bank forecast accuracy, and that
the pattern of results provides no support for the notion that central bank
forecasts become worse under inﬂation targeting.
THE PHILLIPS CURVE IS FLATTER. Natural rate theory (which is based
loosely on the Lucas-Phelps model) implies that, when the inﬂation rate
becomes more predictable, unemployment shifts will be mainly those aris-
ing from real shocks and hence not associated with a negatively sloped
Phillips curve. One does not have to believe in a strict natural rate theory to
see that the graphs in this paper seem roughly consistent with the story that
uncertainty about monetary policy has declined, and with it the slope of the
Phillips curve, as the natural rate theory suggests. Of course, if agents in
the economy were trying to use the aggregate price level to measure an
otherwise unobservable unemployment rate, this could have negative side
effects. But the unemployment rate is, for the time being, published data.
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES. The authors’ setup in this paper provides a clear
description of how a public authority that announced projected time paths
for real asset prices could cause distortions. For example, a central bank
that announced that house prices were too high and published charts show-
ing a decline in prices could, at least temporarily, produce an unjustiﬁed
decline via the coordination on public information that the authors model.
This is an argument against the central bank even making statements about
house prices, much less taking policy actions based on its private assess-
ment of the housing market.
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4. Tulip (2005).But Morris and Shin instead seem to believe that inflation targeting
and monetary policy transparency might lead to asset price bubbles. Why
they think so is unclear, at least to me. Asset price bubbles have occurred
repeatedly in history, under many monetary policy regimes. They are basi-
cally a real phenomenon, involving uncertainty about a novel investment
technology and a division in the market between optimists and pessimists.
The optimists borrow from the pessimists and thereby ﬁnance a runup in
asset prices. Sometimes, but not always, the optimists turn out to be wrong.
Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the early optimists are generally
right, the late optimists are generally wrong, and there is great ex ante
uncertainty about the date separating the late ones from the early ones. But
we lack a model of how transparent monetary policy and stable prices play
into this process. It seems to me most likely that a general policy of having
the central bank declare when “early” has become “late,” and at that point
contracting monetary policy, would increase the variability of the price
level without any offsetting good effects. Of course, to the extent that asset
prices affect wealth, and hence spending, and hence eventually prices, the
central bank should take account of them.
The United States has recently had a stock price boom that ended with-
out major disruption to the price level or output growth. In Australia, as
the authors point out, an inﬂation-targeting bank weathered a house price
boom well. The Reserve Bank of Australia did engage in contractionary
policy during the house price boom, but it rationalized its contraction on
the basis of its forecast of an acceleration in the inﬂation rate.
In November 2003 the Reserve Bank raised the policy rate by 1 per-
centage point and held it there through the beginning of 2005. As the fol-
lowing actual inflation figures show, it appears that the Reserve Bank
anticipated correctly that inflation was on the rise:
Australia: quarterly change in the consumption deﬂator
Percent a year, annualized
2002:1 3.68 2004:1 3.55
2002:2 1.22 2004:2 1.17
2002:3 2.43 2004:3 1.17
2002:4 1.61 2004:4 2.33
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mate of inﬂation, but it does not appear that this was a case of raising
interest rates to stop a house price boom when concerns about aggregate
inﬂation did not justify raising rates.
IS THERE ANY DOWNSIDE TO INFLATION TARGETING? Morris and Shin
do not present a convincing case against inﬂation targeting, based on wor-
ries about such targeting repressing private information gathering. It is worth
mentioning, however, that there are other, stronger reasons to think that
inﬂation targeting is not a universal cure for the ailments of monetary policy.
Inﬂation targeting is a good idea when the central bank can actually
control inﬂation. If it cannot, then inﬂation targeting will either simply
fail and undermine credibility, or temporarily succeed by misleading the
public, thereby making things eventually worse. In many developing
economies the ﬁscal policy that is essential backing for central bank con-
trol of the price level is in doubt, and in those circumstances it may be bet-
ter for the central bank simply to forecast inﬂation and point out the extent
to which its forecasts are contingent on ﬁscal policy.
In the United States and other advanced economies, it has for decades
been the norm to assume away any problems with ﬁscal backing for mon-
etary policy. Today, however, with a Congress and an executive branch
that seem convinced that lower taxes are always better and have been dis-
covering that, if spending opportunities entail no tax increase, many of
those opportunities are politically attractive, the United States may now be
conducting a natural experiment in the limits on central bank control over
the price level. One should hope that they and the Federal Reserve do not
embark on such an experiment and on inﬂation targeting at the same time.
General discussion: Alan Blinder remarked that the fundamental argu-
ment for central bank transparency is that the overnight interest rate is just
not that important for most economic transactions. What matter are longer
rates, as well as other prices that reﬂect expectations over relatively long
horizons, such as exchange rates, stock prices, or even real estate prices.
All of these are only loosely connected to the overnight rate. The one-year
interest rate, for example, should depend on 365 consecutive overnight
rates, yet the central bank determines directly only today’s overnight rate;
the other 364 are expectations of future rates. Influencing expectations,
Blinder concluded, is the essence of monetary policy, and the relevant
question is whether transparency aids in that task.
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central bank’s forecasts—the focus of the authors’ analysis—but also to
the central bank’s own future actions. He found it hard to see how the pub-
lic’s forecast of the Federal Reserve’s behavior could improve on the Fed’s
own forecasts of that behavior. Hence he did not believe the authors’ argu-
ment as it related to transparency about the central bank’s intentions. Blinder
concluded that reducing the information that the central bank provides about
its own future actions would almost certainly result in efﬁciency losses.
But he recognized that, in practice, it would be almost impossible for central
banks to forecast their own behavior without revealing their underlying eco-
nomic forecast; hence the issues raised by Morris and Shin arose indirectly.
Blinder also observed that private Wall Street forecasters are not the
typical economic agents assumed in most economic models. Wall Street
analysts pay a lot of attention to Federal Reserve forecasts, but most other
economic agents do not. Therefore Blinder thought it unlikely that increased
transparency would signiﬁcantly reduce the ﬂow of information about the
economy coming from these agents: decisionmakers at Boeing, General
Motors, and Wal-Mart are not likely to put less effort into forecasting their
markets just because the Federal Reserve reveals more about its view of the
economy. Finally, Blinder reminded the panel that, apart from considera-
tions of policy effectiveness, there is an important social value to openness
in a democracy. As a public body, the central bank should be accountable
to the public, and transparency is an important element of accountability.
David Laibson suggested that central bankers like to be seen by the pub-
lic as having substantial control over the economy. In reality, however, the
future path of the economy is subject to much uncertainty, which the pub-
lic fails to recognize. Therein, in Laibson’s view, lies the principal beneﬁt
of central bank transparency: it requires explicit central bank forecasts of
the economy. If central bankers focus on a single path, or if they place
unrealistically narrow error bands on their estimates, the public will come
to realize that they are being overconfident. In highly uncertain times,
these error bands on central bank forecasts will have to be especially wide.
Transparency will therefore result in the public having a more realistic
assessment of future uncertainty, to which they can respond appropriately.
Laibson drew parallels with the current debate between the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce and the White House over the federal budget deﬁcit. He
believed that such debate is important and that a similarly open dialogue
among central bankers could prove equally valuable.
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omy was limited, and he suggested that the paper exaggerated the Federal
Reserve’s inﬂuence. The Federal Reserve controls monetary policy but has
no control over many other factors—the federal budget, trade, private sav-
ing and investment decisions—that also matter to economic outcomes.
Uncertainty about these factors and about the response of output, wages,
and prices to changes in these factors not only makes forecasts uncertain,
but also creates uncertainty about the effects of policy itself. Duesenberry
mentioned two signiﬁcant changes of the last few decades—a lesser role
of unions and a greater impact of foreign competition in the inflation
process—that have changed the response to whatever action the Federal
Reserve might take.
Duesenberry emphasized that the Federal Reserve is faced with uncer-
tainty about its forecasts and with an economy whose structure changes
over time. Furthermore, the effects of its own policy instruments are uncer-
tain and occur only with long lags. Duesenberry thought it entirely appro-
priate in these circumstances for the Federal Reserve to behave as it has
most of the time under Chairman Alan Greenspan, moving policy in the
direction it thinks appropriate, but only a little bit at a time. He recognized
that certain exceptional circumstances would justify sudden moves, but he
argued that, most of the time, gradualism combined with targets, which are
partly inﬂation targets, partly employment targets, and partly other things,
is the right way to go. But with this mode of conducting policy it was difﬁ-
cult to envisage the Federal Reserve coming out with a clear-cut announce-
ment of what it is doing and why—the process is just too complicated.
Edmund Phelps found the authors’ contrast of the views of Friedrich
von Hayek with those of Oskar Lange somewhat misleading. Hayek
argued that only a market economy could make effective use of the spe-
cialized knowledge held only at the industry level; Lange argued that
socialism could work like a market economy by auctioning goods to gen-
erate prices, using the private information of socialist managers in the
process. Both Lange and Hayek valued markets, although it is true that
Lange did not address the issue of freedom for entrepreneurial initiative,
which Hayek clearly had in mind.
The discussion then turned to the relationship between transparency and
inﬂation targeting. Phelps was sympathetic to the authors’ views and was
surprised that Christopher Sims and Benjamin Friedman seemed so skepti-
cal in their discussions of the paper. Phelps noted that, during the second
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was experiencing a structural change, which he regarded as a structural
boom causing a temporary fall in the natural rate of unemployment. Rein-
forcing this belief was the fact that the inﬂation rate was tending down-
ward. Phelps argued that this information value of the inﬂation rate would
have been lost if the Federal Reserve had openly and credibly aimed at a
ﬁxed and explicit inﬂation rate target. Sims countered that the low inﬂation
of the 1990s still would have taken place and still would have been infor-
mative had there been inﬂation targeting. The Federal Reserve would have
had to undertake surprisingly easy monetary policy in order to reach its
target, and that would have provided the same information. In fact, Sims
thought, one could argue that monetary policy and the actual inflation
process were not very different from what they would have been with
inflation targeting. Duesenberry commented that the Federal Reserve
needs to recognize that focusing only on inflation can have considerable
cost, both social and political. Although in some circumstances these costs
may be the price that has to be paid to end inﬂation, they should be taken
into account in deciding policy.
Ellen Meade pointed out that the Federal Reserve has increased its
transparency in many ways since the early 1990s, for example by announc-
ing that it was targeting the federal funds rate and by releasing transcripts
of Federal Open Market Committee meetings. The conclusions of the pres-
ent paper were not inconsistent with these steps being in the right direc-
tion; the authors were simply arguing that, in the limit, such transparency
could be counterproductive. She wished the authors had provided some
empirical evidence about where that limit lies. Benjamin Friedman agreed
and further argued that the Federal Reserve in recent years has been much
more transparent than the Bank of England and many other inflation-
targeting central banks. A central bank that targets inﬂation is not neces-
sarily more transparent in conveying its views of the economy than one
that does not. William Brainard concurred and remarked that there were a
multitude of factors about which the central bank could be more or less
transparent. Inﬂation targeting provides transparency about the central
bank’s objective function. Some have argued that this provides a major
beneﬁt by helping anchor the public’s inﬂation expectations. But anchor-
ing expectations about output may be at least as important, if ﬁrms’ invest-
ment decisions depend more on their expectations about the need for
additional capacity than on interest rates or inﬂation.
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